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Abstract 
This paper revisits the defence-growth nexus for the rivals of the Israeli-Arab 
conflict over the last four decades. To this end, we utilize the Toda and Yamamoto (1995) 
causality test and the generalized variance decomposition. Contrary to the conventional 
wisdom and many earlier studies, we fail to detect any persistent adverse impact of 
military expenditures on economic growth. Our conclusions are kept intact even when we 
account for the possibility of endogenous structural breaks and during the post-1979 peace 
treaty period. Our findings imply insignificant peace dividends once the conflict is resolved 
and the military spending is cut to internationally acceptable standards. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Economists have long debated how military spending affects economic growth and 
whether causality runs from defence to growth or vice versa. On one hand, causality, 
whether negatively or positively, can run from defence to economic growth; military 
spending, as other government expenditures, may impede economic growth by crowding-
out private investment. Moreover, higher military spending results in distorted resource 
allocations, and the diversion of resources from productive activities to accumulation of 
armaments and maintenance of military forces. However, in his seminal work, Benoit 
(1978) asserted that for Least Developed Countries (LDCs), only a small portion of the 
decrease in military spending, if any at all, is channelled to productive investment. 
Therefore, reducing military spending will not necessarily enhance economic growth. He 
further asserted that in LDCs, military spending would have a positive impact on growth 
via contributing to the civilian economy indirectly by enhancing accumulation of human 
capital. Additionally, military forces also engage in certain R&D and production activities 
that spill over to benefit the civilian sectors. Military spending can also affect economic 
growth positively through the expansion of aggregate demand (the Keynesian effect). The 
resulting increased demand leads to increased utilization of otherwise idle capital, higher 
employment and profits, and therefore higher investment.  
One the other hand, causality can, as well, run on the opposite direction from 
economic growth to defence. In contrast to Benoit, Joerding (1986) claimed that a growing 
country may want to strengthen itself against foreign or domestic threats by increasing its 
military spending. Alternatively, a growing economy may choose to divert resources from 
the military sector to more productive sectors to further enhance growth. 
 Only a few studies have addressed the relationship between defence and economic 
growth for the Middle East economies, in general, and for the major rivals of the Israeli-
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Arab conflict, in particular. Most of these studies implicitly assumed a causality running 
from defence spending to economic growth despite the fact that the opposite direction is 
theoretically plausible as well. The most common approaches to assess the defence growth 
relationship are the growth regressions and Granger causality tests.1 The findings of the 
previous studies are inconclusive and vary depending on the countries examined, samples, 
and econometric methods.  
Traditional Granger causality tests that gained popularity in the last two decades 
have been shown to have non-standard asymptotic properties if the variables are integrated 
or cointegrated. Moreover, the need for pre-tests for unit roots and cointegration and the 
inapplicability when the variables have different orders of integration further add to the 
distortions associated with Granger causality from within VAR or vector error correction 
(VEC) settings.  
Unlike other studies that have used the traditional Granger causality test or 
causality from within a VEC, we utilize a causality procedure suggested by Toda and 
Yamamoto (1995) to examine the causal relationship between defence and economic 
growth. Their procedure requires the estimation of an augmented VAR that guarantees the 
asymptotic distribution of the Wald statistic. Also, the procedure does not require pre-
testing for integration or cointegration properties of the VAR system, and thus avoids the 
potential biases of pre-testing. Our study takes into account the likely structural breaks in 
the series by testing for multiple breaks utilizing the Bai and Perron (2003) test. Moreover, 
we analyze the causal relationship between defence and growth after signing the peace 
treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1979 to assess whether a significant change in this 
relationship has occurred. 
In addition to using the Toda and Yamamoto (1995), we examine the out-of-sample 
causality using the generalized forecast error variance decomposition method of Pesaran 
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and Shin (1998). Unlike the traditional orthogonalized Cholesky method, this method does 
not require ordering of the variables in the VAR system, something that is often 
determined arbitrary given the absence of sound theoretical base. 
The outline of this paper is as follows. The next section provides an overview of the 
literature dealing with the defence-growth nexus for Middle Eastern countries and it is 
followed by an exposition of the theoretical econometric foundations. The fourth section 
presents the data resources and definitions. Our results of the causality tests are presented 
in the fifth section and the last section concludes. 
PREVIOUS STUDIES 
As we mentioned earlier, only few studies have addressed the relationship between 
military expenditures and economic growth for the Middle Eastern countries, in general, 
and for the four rivals of the Israeli-Arab conflict, in particular. These studies provide 
mixed evidence, although the hypothesis of defence spending slowing economic 
performance is the dominant one. 
In an early paper, Lebovic and Ishaq (1987) use a three-equation model employing 
panel data techniques for 20 Middle Eastern economies over the period 1973-1982. They 
find that military spending impedes economic growth for various groups of countries and 
for different alternative measures of military burden. These conclusions are shared by 
Linden (1992) who used an augmented two-sector growth model to study the effect of 
military burden on growth for a panel of 13 Middle East countries from 1973 to 1985 
applying generalized least squares. Opposite findings are reported by Cohen and Ward 
(1996) who estimate a single equation model that relates growth to investments, military 
and non-military government spending, and population growth. They find that the benefits 
from military spending are large and affecting growth positively irrespective of the time 
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period. Thus, they confirm the existence of a Keynesian effect that is roughly equivalent 
for both military and non-military government expenditures.    
Mixed results were reported by DeRouen (1995) who examine the military 
expenditures of Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria for the period 1953-88. He suggests that 
Egypt and Syria would realize the dividends from slashing their military spending only if 
they increase allocations to non-defence government spending. As to Israel, he asserts that 
defence cuts alone may actually deter growth in the short run. Furthermore, he finds that 
military spending had a negative effect on growth after 1967 coupled with positive military 
externalities on civilian output. Surprisingly, DeRouen (1995) finds that the defence sector 
in Jordan is very productive and therefore defence cuts would not lead to higher growth. 
Diverting from the traditional practices, Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn (2003) apply 
causality tests from within a VEC setting and Cholesky variance decomposition to uncover 
the direction of causality between defence and growth for Egypt, Israel, and Syria. They 
find that in a trivariate setting (government civilian expenditure, military spending, and 
growth) there is evidence for bidirectional causality and that military burden negatively 
affects economic growth for all countries whereas civilian government expenditures 
positively affect growth in Egypt and Israel. 
A recent study by Yildirim et al. (2005) covering 13 Middle Eastern countries and 
applying dynamic panel data provides support for Benoit (1978). The authors find that 
military expenditures enhance economic growth in the Middle East.   
Several studies have focused on the defence-growth nexus in Israel. Cohen et al. 
(1996) tackled the relationship by emphasizing the indirect linkages via investment and 
labour. They estimate a dynamic three-equation (investment, labour, and growth) model 
for the period 1960-1992 and conclude that the benefits for Israel from cutting military 
spending are small and positive, normally delayed for several years, and operate indirectly 
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through investments. The indirect positive impact through investments was portrayed as 
well by Looney and Winterford (1995) for the period 1955-1987. They assert that they 
found no support for negative effect of high military burden on the Israeli economy mainly 
due to the American assistance. Evidence of non-linearity in the defence-growth 
relationship is reported by Bichler and Nitzan (1996). They claim that throughout the 
1950s and most of the 1960s defence spending had a positive effect on growth through 
accumulation of human capital and smoother assimilation of new immigrants. However, 
since the late 1960, the large defence budgets led to higher debt and slower growth. 
DeRouen (2000) further analyzed the effects of military and no-military government 
spending on economic growth of Israel in a three-sector production function model for the 
years 1953-1992. His nonlinear least squares estimates suggest that when controlling for 
technological growth, short-term increases in defence spending hinder economic growth 
whereas non-defence spending have the opposite effect. Based on his findings, he 
recommends using saved resources from cutting military spending in the peace era for 
infrastructure and private investments. 
ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGIES 
Economists often utilize vector autoregressions (VARs) to make inferences on 
causal relationships among endogenous variables. However Sims et al. (1990) and others 
have argued that, in general, the traditional Wald test for exact linear restrictions on the 
parameters in levels VAR does not have the usual asymptotic distributions if the variables 
are integrated or cointegrated. Proper inferences on VAR levels can be made only if all 
variables are known to be stationary. Otherwise, one can use VAR in differences if all 
variables are known to be integrated of order one but not cointegrated, and through the 
specification of a VEC model if all variables are I(1) and cointegrated. However, in most 
cases the order of integration and cointegration is not known a priori and pretesting for unit 
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roots and cointegration is necessary before conducting causality tests. Consequently, the 
validity of causality tests is conditional on avoiding biases in testing for unit roots and 
cointegration among the variables. Econometric studies report that the pre-testing biases 
might be severe because the power of the unit root test is generally very low and tests for 
Johansen cointegration are not very reliable in finite samples.2 
A recent procedure proposed by Toda and Yamamoto (1995) bypasses the need for 
potentially biased pre-tests for unit roots and cointegration, common to other formulations. 
The procedure utilizes the Wald test statistic for testing linear restrictions on the 
coefficients in an augmented VAR. The Modified WALD (MWALD) causality test has an 
asymptotic chi-squared distribution with p degrees of freedom in the limit when a VAR 
(p+dmax) is estimated, where p is the optimal lag order in the unrestricted levels VAR and 
dmax is the maximal order of integration of the variables in the VAR system. The causality 
procedure is implemented in two steps. In the first step, the correct order of the unrestricted 
level VAR (p) is to be determined using one of the information criteria methods, and dmax 
is to be determined using one of the unit root tests. The selected )( pVAR is then augmented 
by the maximal order of integration and a VAR of order (p+ maxd ) is estimated. Testing 
for causality in a bivariate system entails estimating the following augmented VAR of 
order (p+ maxd ): 
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In the above setting, long-run Granger causality from variable Y2 to variable Y1 is evaluated 
by testing the null hypothesis that 0...
,121,12 === pββ , and causality from variable Y1 to Y2 
is examined by testing the null hypothesis that 0...
,211,21 === pββ . Toda and Yamamoto 
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(1995) proved that the Wald statistic for testing the above null hypothesis converges in 
distribution to a 2pχ  random variable. The application of this procedure ensures that the 
usual test statistic for Granger causality has the standard asymptotic distribution and valid 
inference can be carried out.3 
 FEVD has been used repetitively by economists to examine the out-of-sample 
properties of the relationship between the variables in a VAR system. The method enables 
researchers to shed light not only on the direction but also on the intensity of the causal 
relationships between variables. Generally speaking, FEVD analysis decomposes the 
forecast error variance of a variable into proportions attributed to shocks in other variables, 
as well as its own. Most researchers have used the Cholesky decomposition that requires 
ordering of the variables. Without a sound theoretical base, ordering is arbitrary and the 
results may vary greatly depending on the ordering. As an alternative, Pesaran and Shin 
(1998) proposed a generalized FEVD that circumvent the need for ordering the variables 
and produce unique results by utilizing the contemporaneous correlations of the variables 
under investigation. Unlike the Cholesky decomposition, the generalized FEVD does not 
impose the restriction that the underlying shocks to the VAR are orthogonalized prior to 
decomposing the forecast error variances. 
DATA DESCRIPTION AND SOURCES  
Raw data were obtained from the following two main sources. (1) Real military 
expenditures in 2003 constant prices in US dollars as well as the share of military 
expenditures in GDP for the years 1988-2004 which were obtained from the SIPRI online 
database available at http://www.sipri.org. (2) Real military expenditures in 1993 constant 
prices in US dollars and the share of military expenditures in GNP for the period 1963-
1987 which were obtained from a database compiled by Beenstock (1998). For the years 
1960-1963 we derived the real GNP series using growth rates from the World 
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Development Indicators (WDI) online database (http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline), 
with the exception of Jordan for which the growth rates were taken from the PWT database 
available at http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu. Military expenditures were converted to real 2000 
prices US dollars using the GDP deflator and the GNP/GDP ratio series from the WDI 
online database. The final product consists of military expenditures in US dollars at 2000 
constant prices and the military burden proxied by the share of military expenditures in 
GDP. 
In addition to the three Arab countries that constitute the major front line rivals of 
Israel, we constructed an aggregated Arab measure for the military expenditures, military 
burden and GDP. This measure is intended to assess the defence-growth nexus for the 
Arab bloc as whole.  
RESULTS 
 In order to apply the Toda and Yamamoto (1995) we tested for the maximal order 
of integration of the variables in the VAR system using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) unit root test. The results that are presented in Table 1 show that most of the series 
are integrated of order 1 with the exception of the GDP series of Egypt and the aggregated 
Arab GDP series. Thus, the maximal of integration (dmax) is one for Israel, Jordan, and 
Syria and Two for Egypt and Arab and the VAR systems would be augmented 
accordingly. 
 Our results of the Toda and Yamamoto (1998) causality tests are presented in Table 
2. We conduct the test for two military measures; real military expenditures and military 
burden which is defined as the share of military expenditures in GDP. A quick look reveals 
the absence of any causal relationships between both military measures and growth. The 
only exception is a barely significant positive causality running from growth to military 
burden for Syria meaning that higher growth would lead to allocating higher portion of 
10 
 
GDP to military expenditures. Thus, in contrast to the widely documented negative impact 
of military expenditures on growth, we fail to detect any causality.  
To further examine whether our results are driven by structural breaks in the series 
we conduct the Bai and Perron (2003) multiple structural breaks test for all series. The 
results, presented in Table 3, show the presence of varied significant structural breaks for 
the military and GDP series. Generally speaking, the breaks in the military series 
correspond to higher military expenditures in the late 1960s and the early 1970s, the period 
between the major wars of 1967 and 1973, and a drastic decline following the initiation of 
the peace talks between Egypt and Israel in the late 1970s. Incorporating structural breaks 
into out tests yields few changes to the results that omitted such breaks. The results that are 
presented in Table 4 show that when we take the real military expenditures as our defence 
measure we find a positive unidirectional causality running from military expenditures to 
economic growth for Syria (significant only at the 10% level) and for the Arab aggregate 
(significant at 5%). No causal relationships were detected for Egypt, Israel, and Jordan. In 
contrast to the widely documented adverse impact of military expenditures on economic 
growth, we find either weak positive impact or no causality. 
The peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1979 marked a drastic change in the 
dynamics of the Israel-Arab conflict. Egypt, the largest and most dominant member of the 
Arab front against Israel ceased to play a major role in the conflict and even in the Arab 
and Muslim world. Additionally, the volume of military expenditures, not only of Egypt 
and Israel, but also Jordan and Syria dropped sharply. In order to assess whether this event 
has led to a change in the relationship under investigation, we conducted the same 
causality test for the four countries after 1979. Doing so, the number of observations per 
country dropped from 45 to 25 and the power of our tests is affected. Thus, we should 
examine the results carefully and bear in mind the low number of observations. Table 5 
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presents the results of the causality tests after 1979 and reveals a totally different picture of 
the nature of the defence-growth relationship with mixed evidence. We find several cases 
in which military spending impedes growth (Jordan, and Arab when taking real military 
spending and Jordan, Syria, and Arab for military burden), however, the negative impact is 
usually insignificant. We also detect that military spending of Egypt fosters growth 
although it is barely significant. The reversed direction of causality is present in our results 
as well. Increased output leads to a lower military spending for Syria but higher overall 
spending of the Arab countries. As we have stated, these results have to be interpreted 
cautiously due to the low power of the test and marginal significance of the sign of 
causality. 
Another tool that can help us gauge the direction and strength, but not the sign, of 
the out-of-sample causality is the forecast error variance decomposition. The results of the 
Generalized FEVD are portrayed in Tables 6 and 7. These results clearly show that own 
shocks explain most of the forecast error variance of the variables while shocks to other 
variables only marginally help explain the forecast error variance. The results indicate the 
possibility of a weak bidirectional causality for Jordan and Syria when using the real 
military spending as the measure for defence since each variable explains about 11% of the 
forecast error variance of the other variable. Overall, the Generalized FEVD results verify 
the results of our Toda and Yamamoto (1995) causality tests; we find very weak or 
nonexistent causal relationship between the defence spending and economic growth.    
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 This paper investigates the causal relationship between military spending and 
economic growth for the four rivals of the Israeli-Arab conflict over the 1960-2004 period 
utilizing a causality test developed by Toda and Yamamoto (1995) and the Generalized 
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FEVD suggested by Pesaran and Shin (1998). We conduct our analysis for two measures 
of military; real military spending and military burden. 
 Overall, we find weak or nonexistent causal relationship between defence and 
economic growth and fail to provide support for the conventional wisdom of adverse 
impact of military spending on economic growth. The causality analysis was conducted 
also with incorporating the likely structural breaks of the variables that were endogenously 
determined using the Bai and Perron (2003) multiple breaks test. However, our conclusions 
were not altered. Mixed results, mostly insignificant, were found when we addressed the 
post-1979 period, but due to the short time period one should expect the power of our 
causality tests to be relatively low. When examining the out-of-sample causality using the 
Generalized FEVD we found very weak causal relationship between defence and growth. 
The lack of causal relationships between military spending and growth, in general, 
and the absence of adverse impact of military spending on the economic performance of 
the countries, in particular, cast serious doubts on the size of benefits that the involved 
countries would gain once they cut their military spending to internationally prevalent 
levels. Our results imply that these countries are not expected to harvest substantial 
dividends once a sustained peace has been achieved, however, one has to consider not only 
the pure economic costs/benefits of the conflict, but all the other aspects of life that would 
certainly improve and contribute to a more peaceful and productive environment. 
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Notes 
                                                 
1
 See Dunne et al., 2005 for a critical review of the models used to examine the defence-growth relationship. 
2
 See Toda and Yamamoto (1995) and Pesaran et al. (2001). 
3
 Zapata and Rambaldi (1997). 
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Table 1 - ADF Unit Root Test 
Real Military Expenditures 
 Levels First differences 
 
ADF Lag ADF lag 
Egypt -2.83 3 -5.09*** 0 
Israel -1.96 0 -7.85*** 0 
Jordan -2.38 0 -7.65*** 0 
Syria -1.32 0 -5.04*** 0 
Arab -2.41 2 -3.04** 1 
Military Burden 
Egypt -2.66 2 -3.03** 1 
Israel -1.83 0 -8.30*** 0 
Jordan -2.33 0 -6.07*** 1 
Syria -1.70 0 -7.96*** 0 
Arab -2.71 2 -4.40*** 0 
GDP 
Egypt -0.47 1 -2.40† 0 
Israel -1.03 0 -4.30*** 0 
Jordan -1.85 2 -3.31** 2 
Syria -1.86 0 -6.77*** 0 
Arab -0.14 0 -1.34† 1 
 
    
Notes: 
Optimal lag length based on SIC with 8 maximum lags allowed. 
† The series is I(2). 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. 
 
  
Table 2 – Toda and Yamamoto (1995) Causality Test†  
Country Lag MEXY Y  MEX 
Real Military Expenditures 
Egypt 1 0.44 0.003 
Israel 1 0.01 0.36 
Jordan 1 0.02 2.19 
Syria 1 1.49 0.59 
Arab 1 2.26 0.21 
Military Burden 
Egypt 2 0.79 0.34 
Israel 1 0.04 0.20 
Jordan 1 0.04 0.02 
Syria 1 0.44 3.20*(+)* 
Arab 1 0.07 0.71 
 
Notes: 
† F test. 
 indicates the direction of causality. 
Optimal lags of the VAR are based on SIC with maximum 4 lags allowed. 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. The sign 
in parenthesis indicates the sign of causality.  
 
 Table 3 - Bai and Perron (2003) Test of Multiple Break Points 
 
Military Expenditures Military Burden GDP 
 
Break 1 Break 2 Break 1 Break 2 Break 1 Break 2 
Egypt 1969 1977 1969 1977 1981 1995 
Israel 1972 1982 1972 1986 1978 1993 
Jordan 1975 1983 1981 1989 1979 1994 
Syria 1974 1986 1967 1986 1975 1992 
Arab 1968 1987 1969 1977 1975 1992 
Notes: 
• Estimation with minimum 8 years between breakpoints. 
  
 
Table 4 – Toda and Yamamoto (1995) Causality Test: 
With Structural Breaks† 
 
Country Lag MEXY Y  MEX 
Real Military Expenditures 
Egypt 1 1.82 0.48 
Israel 1 0.04 0.01 
Jordan 1 0.59 0.38 
Syria 2 4.57**(+)* 0.49 
Arab 1 5.03**(+)** 0.35 
Military Burden 
Egypt 2 1.23 1.93 
Israel 1 2.14 1.88 
Jordan 1 0.001 0.09 
Syria 1 1.46 3.69*(+)* 
Arab 1 2.41 0.88 
 
Notes: 
† F test. 
 indicates the direction of causality. 
Optimal lags of the VAR are based on SIC with maximum 4 lags allowed. 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. The sign 
in parenthesis indicates the sign of causality. 
 
  
Table 5 – Toda and Yamamoto (1995) Causality Test: After 1979† 
Country Lag MEXY Y  MEX 
Real Military Expenditures 
Egypt 1 3.95*(+)* 1.19 
Israel 1 0.06 0.37 
Jordan 3 5.36***(-) 1.11 
Syria 4 0.54 7.35***(-)* 
Arab 2 5.80**(-)** 8.88***(+)** 
Military Burden 
Egypt 2 0.41 2.85*(+)* 
Israel 1 1.98 1.52 
Jordan 2 6.53***(-) 0.87 
Syria 2 3.48*(-) 0.27 
Arab 3 4.60(-) 1.47 
 
Notes: 
† F test. 
 indicates the direction of causality. 
Optimal lags of the VAR are based on SIC with maximum 4 lags allowed. 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. The sign in parenthesis 
indicates the sign of causality. 
  
Table 6 – Generalized FEVD for Military Measure (%) 
 
Explained by own shock after … 
years 
Explained by a shock to Y after … 
years 
 0 1 5 10 0 1 5 10 
Real Military Expenditures 
Egypt 100 98.95 97.17 96.98 0.83 2.22 4.14 4.33 
Israel 100 99.61 99.60 99.60 1.47 2.16 2.16 2.16 
Jordan 100 98.85 98.82 98.82 11.15 10.86 10.92 10.92 
Syria 100 99.47 99.47 99.47 10.11 11.52 11.55 11.55 
Arab 100 99.59 96.41 94.32 0.53 1.11 4.73 6.90 
Military Burden 
Egypt 100 9.45 98.01 97.83 1.15 2.22 3.95 4.14 
Israel 100 99.92 99.92 99.92 5.41 5.80 5.79 5.79 
Jordan 100 99.80 99.80 99.79 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.26 
Syria 100 95.05 94.71 94.71 0.09 4.87 5.21 5.22 
Arab 100 99.82 98.35 97.23 3.76 4.33 6.86 8.13 
 
  
Table 7 – Generalized FEVD for Y (%) 
 
Explained by own shock after … 
years 
Explained by a shock to military 
measure after … years 
 0 1 5 10 0 1 5 10 
Real Military Expenditures 
Egypt 100 98.43 96.93 96.81 0.83 3.71 6.12 6.30 
Israel 100 99.95 99.95 99.95 1.48 1.70 1.71 1.71 
Jordan 100 99.95 99.95 99.95 11.15 10.75 10.73 10.73 
Syria 100 97.58 97.56 97.56 10.11 11.47 11.52 11.52 
Arab 100 96.24 94.18 94.06 0.53 3.54 7.39 7.92 
Military Burden 
Egypt 100 99.08 97.56 97.41 1.15 3.25 5.87 6.11 
Israel 100 99.95 99.95 99.95 5.41 5.12 5.11 5.11 
Jordan 100 99.63 99.63 99.63 0.25 0.33 0.33 0.33 
Syria 100 99.32 99.26 99.26 0.09 0.68 0.74 0.74 
Arab 100 99.45 98.94 98.76 3.76 3.60 6.30 7.10 
 
